Grandparental Visitation Rights in Oklahoma by Gan, Cheryl Stockman
Tulsa Law Review 
Volume 26 
Issue 2 Mineral Law Symposium 
Winter 1990 
Grandparental Visitation Rights in Oklahoma 
Cheryl Stockman Gan 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Cheryl S. Gan, Grandparental Visitation Rights in Oklahoma, 26 Tulsa L. J. 245 (2013). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol26/iss2/4 
This Casenote/Comment is brought to you for free and open access by TU Law Digital Commons. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Tulsa Law Review by an authorized editor of TU Law Digital Commons. For more 





Following an increasing legislative trend granting grandparents
broader visitation rights to their minor grandchildren, on November 1,
1989, Oklahoma joined the ranks of fourteen states' which now allow
grandparents the statutory right of visitation under almost any circum-
stances.2 The 1989 amendment to Oklahoma's grandparental visitation
statute allows the courts to award grandparents reasonable visitation
rights if it is in the "best interest of the child" regardless of whether the
family is intact.3
A grandparental visitation statute which allows courts to intervene
into a functional, intact family situation raises serious constitutional con-
cerns. The only guideline an Oklahoma court has in determining
1. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-59 (West 1986); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 950(7) (Supp. 1988);
IDAHO CODE § 32-1008 (1983); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1616(b) (1983); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 405.021 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1984); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 752(b) (Supp. 1990);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-9-102 (1988); N.Y. DoM. REL LAW § 72 (McKinney Supp. 1990); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 14-09-05.1 (Supp. 1987); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-420 (33) (Law. Co-op. 1985);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-5(4) (1989); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1011 (1989); WASH. REv. CODE
ANN. § 26.09.240 (West Supp. 1990); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 880.155 (West Supp. 1989).
2. OKLA. STAr. tit. 10, § 5 (Supp. 1989). The 1989 version of Oklahoma's grandparental
visitation statute restricts the rights of grandparents in a few specified circumstances. See infra note
19.
3. OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 5(A)(1) (Supp. 1989) now provides that: "[pursuant to the provi-
sions of this section, any grandparent of an unmarried minor child shall have reasonable rights of
visitation to the child if the district court deems it to be in the best interest of the child." Id Section
60.16(C) deals with the effect of a final decree of adoption on grandparental visitation rights. That
section provides that "[a] grandparent, who is the parent of the child's natural parents, may be given
reasonable rights of visitation to the child, pursuant to the provisions of Section 5 of this title." Id
§ 60.16(C).
These provisions seem to allow judicial intervention into intact families. However, Section 5(B)
could create an ambiguity in the statute. This section provides that "[n]otice as ordered by the court
shall be given to the person or parent having custody of said child and the venue of such action shall
be in the county of the residence of such person or parent." Id § 5(B) (emphasis added). This
language could be interpreted to limit the language of Section 5(A) so that grandparental visitation
would be limited to situations in which there is only one custodial parent. Therefore, the statute
might not apply to intact nuclear families.
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whether to grant visitation rights is that the visitation be in the child's
best interest. The vagueness of the "best interest" standard could lead to
unwarranted state interference into parental autonomy and the parents'
ability to make decisions regarding the rearing of their children.' The
United States Supreme Court has recognized a fundamental liberty inter-
est in the right of parents to rear their children as they see fit5 and to be
free of unnecessary state intrusion. Grandparental visitation statutes
which guarantee grandparents the right to seek visitation in circum-
stances where the family is intact and functional preempt the constitu-
tionally recognized liberty interests of the family.
As the Oklahoma grandparental visitation statute seemingly allows
state intrusion into an intact family, even in the absence of compelling
circumstances, 7 it is open to constitutional attack. In particular, the
vagueness of the "best interest of the child standard" allows the state to
invoke its parens patriae power below the constitutionally required
threshold of harm to the child.' Absent compelling circumstances,
grandparents or other third parties should not have a right to petition for
visitation to a minor grandchild when the nuclear family is intact and
functional. Oklahoma's grandparental visitation statutes should be
amended to allow grandparents or any third party who has an interest in
the child a right to seek visitation only when there has been a dissolution
of the nuclear family, when the grandparents or third parties have been
4. The state has traditionally held "parens patriae powers" which allow it to protect the wel-
fare of the child. In certain circumstances, the state interest in promoting the welfare of the child
may override the parent's interest in maintaining autonomy. However, before the state intervenes
into the family to promote or protect the child's welfare, the state must prove the parents are either
"unfit, unable, or unwilling to care for the child adequately." See Comment, Developments in the
Law: The Constitution and the Family, 93 HARv. L. REv. 1156, 1201-02 (1980). The state may also
proscribe or limit certain activities which are deemed harmful to children, such as child employ-
ment. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944). See also Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,
402 (1923) (discussing the power of a state to compel school attendance).
5. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 649-51 (1972).
6. See Prince, 321 U.S. at 166 ("It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the
child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obliga-
tions the state can neither supply nor hinder.") (citing Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510
(1925)).
7. See Comment, supra note 4, at 1196 ("That family rights, when their infringement is at its
apex, be outweighed only by compelling state interests is consistent with the level of protection
afforded other substantive constitutional values protected under the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment, such as freedom of speech or religion.").
8. See Bean, Grandparent Visitation: Can the Parent Refuse?, 24 J. FAM. L. 393, 422 (1985)
(noting that the United States Supreme Court has consistently permitted the state's parens patriae
power to only be used to prevent harm to the child when its use interferes with parental autonomy).
See generally Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
[Vol. 26:245
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legal custodians or de facto parents, or under other compelling circum-
stances, such as child abuse or child neglect by the parents.
A. Background
At common law, grandparents had no visitation rights to their mi-
nor grandchildren.9 The parental duty to allow visitation was based on a
moral, not a legal, obligation.1" A majority of courts refused to allow
grandparental visitation with only a few exceptions." Refusal to recog-
nize grandparental rights at common law was based on the rule of paren-
tal autonomy.12  The courts presumed that judicial enforcement of
grandparental visitation would prove divisive to the family by undermin-
ing parental authority 3 and thus ultimately would not be in the best
interest of the child.' 4
The failure of the courts to recognize a common law right of grand-
parental access to their grandchildren induced grandparents to take their
grievances to state legislatures. 5 Recognizing the political clout of these
registered voters, legislators responded to grandparents' efforts. As a re-
sult, all fifty states now have grandparental visitation statutes. 6 These
9. See Succession of Reiss, 46 La. Ann. 347, 15 So. 151 (1894).
10. Id. at 352, 15 So. at 152.
11. See Comment, Grandparental Visitation Statutes: A Proposal for Unifornity, 19 J. MAR-
SHALL L. REv. 703 (1986). The author notes that there were three common law exceptions: (1)
when parties to a divorce had agreed to the grandparental visitation; (2) when evidence was
presented that the custodial parent was unfit; and (3) when the child had been living with the grand-
parent for a period of time. Id at 712.
12. See Mimkon v. Ford, 66 N.J. 426, 431, 332 A.2d 199, 201 (1955). There the court gave five
reasons why grandparents should not be granted visitation rights over the objections of the parents:
(I) Ordinarily the parent's obligation to allow the grandparent to visit the child is moral,
and not legal; (2) The judicial enforcement of grandparent visitation rights would divide
proper parental authority, thereby hindering [that authority]; (3) The best interests of the
child are not furthered by forcing the child into the midst of a conflict of authority and ill
feelings between the parent and grandparent; (4) Where there is a conffict as between
grandparent and parent, the parent alone should be the judge, without having to account to
anyone for the motives in denying the grandparent visitation; (5) The ties of nature are the
only efficacious means of restoring normal family relations and not the coercive measures
which follow judicial intervention.
Id. at 431, 332 A.2d at 202 (citations omitted). See also Foster & Freed, Grandparent Visitation:
Vagaries and Vicissitudes, 23 ST. Louis U.L.J. 643, 645-46 (1979).
13. See Commonwealth ex rel McDonald v. Smith, 170 Pa. Super. 254, 258, 85 A.2d 686, 688
(1952) ("[A] contest for the child's affection .... can lead only to the detriment of the child.").
14. See Segal & George, State Law on Grandparent Visitation: An Overview of Current Statutes,
ABA GRANDPARENT VisrrATON DISPUTES: A LEGAL RESOURCE MANUAL (1989).
15. Id at 5.
16. ALA. CODE § 30-3-4 (1989); ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.150 (1989); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 25-337.01 (West Supp. 1989); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 9-13-103 (Supp. 1989); CAL. CIv. CODE § 4601
(West Supp. 1990); COLO. REv. STAT. § 19-1-117 (Supp. 1990); CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-59
(West 1986); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 950(7) (Supp. 1988); FLA. STAT. § 61.13(2)(b)2.c (West
Supp. 1990); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-3 (Supp. 1990); HAw. REv. STAT. § 571-46(7) (Supp. 1989);
3
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statutes have not created an absolute right of grandparental visitation,
but rather give grandparents the right to petition for court-ordered visita-
tion if visitation is deemed to be in the child's best interest.17
B. Types of Grandparental Visitation Statutes
The various state statutes are inconsistent in their treatment of
grandparental visitation rights and vary widely in scope. The statutes
differ according to who is allowed to petition for visitation, under what
circumstances they may petition, and what standard a court must use in
determining when to grant visitation."8 Oklahoma's new law is one of
the broadest in scope, allowing court-ordered visitation by grandparents
whenever the court deems it appropriate.19 Connecticut's grandparental
visitation statute appears to be one of the most liberal, giving standing to
seek visitation rights to any interested third party under any circum-
stances as long as the best interest of the child standard is satisfied.2"
IDAHO CODE § 32-1008 (1983); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, para. 607(b)(1) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1990);
IND. CODE ANN. § 31-1-11.7-2 (Burns Supp. 1990); IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.35 (West Supp. 1990);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1616(b) (1983); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 405.021 (Michie/Bobbs.Merrill
1984); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:572 (West Supp. 1990); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 752(6)
(Supp. 1990); MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 9-102 (1984); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 39D
(West Supp. 1990); MIcH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.27(1)(b) (West Supp. 1990); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 257.022 (West Supp. 1990); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-16-1 (Supp. 1989); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 452.402 (Vernon Supp. 1990); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-9-102 (1988); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-1802
(1988); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 125A 330 to -340 (1987); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 458:17-d (West
Supp. 1989); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-7.1 (West Supp. 1990); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-9-2 (1989); N.Y.
DOM. REL. LAW § 72 (McKinney Supp. 1990); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.2(bl) (1987); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 14-09-05.1 (Supp. 1987); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3109.05(B) (Baldwin 1988); OYLA.
STAT. tit. 10, § 5 (Supp. 1989); OR. REv. STAT. § 109.121 (1989); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§§ 5311-5314 (Purdon Supp. 1990); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 15-5-24.1- to .3 (1988); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 20-7-420(33) (Law. Co-op. 1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 25-4-52 to -54 (1984); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 36-6-301 (Supp. 1990); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 14.03 (e) -(g) (Vernon Supp. 1988);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-5(4) (1989); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1011 (1989); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-
107.2 (1990); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.09.240 (West Supp. 1990); W. VA. CODE § 48-2B-1
(1986); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 880.155 (West Supp. 1988); Wyo. STAT. § 20-2-113(c) (Supp. 1990).
17. See Segal & George, supra note 14, at 5.
18. See Segal & George, supra note 14, at 6.
19. OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 5(A)(1) (Supp. 1989). The legislature has listed three exceptions to
the general rule. First, Section 5(A)(5) provides that the parents of a father whose child is born out
of wedlock shall not have a right of visitation unless the father has been judicially determined to be
the father of the child, there has been a previous grandparental relationship with the child, and the
visitation is determined to be in the best interest of the child. Id. § 5(A)(5)(a)-(c). Second, Section
5(A)(6) also requires the parents of a mother whose child is born out of wedlock to have had a
previous relationship with the child and the visitation must be deemed to be in the best interest of the
child. Id. § 5(A)(6). Finally, Section 5(A)(4) adds the requirement that petitioning grandparents
have had a substantial relationship with the grandchild and that visitation be in the best interest of
the child, if the parental rights of one or both parents have been terminated. Id. § 5(A)(4).
20. CONN. GEN. STAT ANN. § 46b-59 (West 1986) provides that:
The superior court may grant the right of visitation with respect to any minor child or
children to any person, upon an application of such person. Such order shall be according
4
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Texas' statute is very comprehensive, listing numerous situations which
trigger the right of a grandparent to petition for visitation.21 However,
most states will allow court-ordered visitation only ir. specific situations,
usually upon the death of a parent or in the case of divorce.22
C. Derivative Rights Theory
Many early grandparental visitation statutes were based wholly or
partially on a derivative rights theory of visitation, but that theory has
been largely abandoned.23 Oklahoma originally based its statute on a
derivative rights theory.24 Under the derivative rights theory, the grand-
parent derives the right of access to the grandchild through the parents
so that the right to association with the child can only be claimed upon
the death of the related parent.2' Grandparents could petition for visita-
tion under a derivative rights statute only when they were the parents of
the absent parent.26 The rationale was that the grandparents stepped
into the shoes of their child to represent the absent side of the family.27
The derivative rights theory has been largely abandoned now that most
to the court's best judgment upon the facts of the case and subject to such conditions and
limitations as it deems equitable.... In making, modifying or terminating such an order,
the court shall be guided by the best interest of the child, giving consideration to the wishes
of such child if he is of sufficient age and capable of forming an intelligent opinion.
Id However, this section falls under the general heading of dissolution, separation, etc. Although
many authors suggest this could be interpreted as an "intact family" statute, the courts could con-
strue the statute as being triggered only by the dissolution or separation of a marriage.
21. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.03(e) (Vernon 1990) allows grandparents the right to petition
for access to their grandchildren under the following circumstances: (1) incarceration of a parent; (2)
the parents have been or are about to divorce and are currently separated; (3) the child has been
abused or neglected by the parent; (4) the child has been adjudicated a delinquent; (5) upon termina-
tion of parental rights; or (6) the child has lived with the grandparents seeking access for at least six
months. Id
22. Segal & George, supra note 14, at 9.
23. See Foster & Freed, supra note 12, at 653-54. See also Ingulli, Grandparent Visitation
Rights. Social Policies and Legal Rights, 87 W. VA. L. REv. 295, 311 (1985) (discussing early state
statutes and the derivative rights theory).
24. The original Oklahoma grandparental visitation statute, OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 5 (1971),
provided in pertinent part that:
when one or both parents are deceased, any grandparent, who is the parent of the child's
deceased parent, shall have reasonable rights of visitation to the child, when it is in the best
interest of the child. The district courts are vested with jurisdiction to enforce such visita-
tion rights and make orders relative thereto, upon the filing of a verified application for
such visitation rights. Notice as ordered by the Court shall be given to the person or
parent having custody of said child and the venue of such action shall be in the county of
the residence of such preson or parent.
25. Fernandez, Grandparent Access: A Model Statute, 6 YALE L. & PoL'Y REV. 109, 118
(1988).
26. See Ingulli, supra note 23, at 311.
27. See Ingulli, supra note 23, at 311.
5
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states allow any grandparent the right to visitation when the parents are
either deceased or divorced.28 Including divorce as a situation which
triggers the visitation statute indicates that most state legislatures have
accepted the theory that emotional support of grandparents can help a
child overcome the sense of grief and loss felt when faced with the death
of a parent or the dissolution of the family.29
D. Standard to be Applied
Although statutory language may indicate that states use different
standards to determine when visitation is appropriate, the language is
often so vague that it is virtually meaningless. The majority of the states,
including Oklahoma, use the "best interest of the child" test to determine
whether grandparental visitation should be awarded.30 This standard is
very nebulous and has different meanings in different jurisdictions. How-
ever, there are a few statutes which do specify factors for the court to
consider when using the "best interest of the child" test.31 Other statutes
28. See Segal & George, supra note 14, Appendix A at 19-21 (providing a list of states which
allow grandparental visitation upon the death or divorce of a parent).
29. See Comment, The Constitutional Constraints on Grandparents' Visitation Statutes, 86
COLUM. L. REV. 118, 123-24 and n.29 (1986) ("Those children who had extended families, espe-
cially grandparents, who were close by or who kept up a continuing interest from a distance were
very much helped by this support system.") (quoting . WALLERSTEIN & J. KELLY, SURVIVING THE
BREAKUP: How CHILDREN AND PARENTS COPE WITH DIVORCE 43-44, 222 (1986)).
30. Often the lack of parameters in defining "the best interest of the child" allows the judge to
rely on individual preconceived notions about the nature of the grandparent-grandchild relationship.
In Mimkon v. Ford, 66 N.J. 426, 332 A.2d 199 (1975) the court stated:
A very special relationship often arises and continues between grandparents and grandchil-
dren. The tensions and conflicts which commonly mar relations between parents and chil-
dren are often absent between those very same parents and their grandchildren. Visits with
a grandparent are often a precious part of a child's experience and there are benefits which
devolve upon the grandchild from the relationship with his grandparents which he cannot
derive from any other relationship.
Id at 437, 332 A.2d at 204-05. In some instances, a judge may let his own sentimentality about the
nature of grandparent-grandchild relationships impair his objectivity. In Commonwealth ex rel.
Goodman v. Dratch, 192 Pa. Super. 1, 3, 159 A.2d 70, 71 (1960), the court based its decision on the
premise that it would be "almost inhuman to completely isolate a child from the grandparents," in
spite of the fact that a psychologist testified that any right of visitation would be detrimental to the
child's psychological health.
31. The Vermont grandparental visitation statute lists factors to be considered by the court,
including "the love, affection and other emotional ties existing between the grandparents involved
and the child," VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15 § 1013(b)(1) (1989), "the moral fitness of the parties," id. at
§ 1013(b)(4), the reasonable preference of the child, if the court deems the child to be of sufficient
age to express a preference." Id at § 1013(b)(6). The Nevada grandparental visitation statute re-
quires the court to consider: the love, affection and other emotional ties existing between the party
seeking visitation and the child; the prior relationship between the child and the party seeking visita-
tion; the reasonable preference of the child; and the mental and physical health of the party seeking
visitation. NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 125A.330 (1987). A proposed bill in North Dakota, S.B. 2398
6
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use language such as "at the discretion of the court," 2 and "substantial
relationship" 3 to define the parameters of the courts' discretion. All of
these standards are vague, as they do little to clarify when a court should
award visitation. Finally, some statutes do not specify a standard at all. 4
These major variations among state statutes demonstrate the confusion
among legislators when trying to balance the competing interests of the
grandparent, the child, and the child's parents.
E. Child's Rights Theory
Commentators suggest that providing broader visitation rights to
grandparents is a step toward recognizing the rights of the child. 5
Child's rights advocates point to the breakdown of the nuclear family in
modem society as one of the major reasons for the need to maintain rela-
tionships between children and their relatives, especially grandparents.36
(1989 ch. 178) would require evidence of domestic violence to be considered as a factor affecting the
best interest and welfare of the child.
32. See ALA. CODE § 30-3-4 (1989); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.2(bi) (1987); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 3109.05(B) (Baldwin 1988); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-5(4) (1989) ("the court shall consider
the welfare of the child"); W. VA. CODE § 48-2B-1 (1986).
33. IDAHO CODE § 32-1008 (1983);N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.2(bl) (1987).
34. In these jurisdictions, caselaw fills in the gaps for the courts, requiring consideration of such
factors as (1) animosity between parents and grandparents, see In re Adoption of Bermian, 44 Cal.
App. 3d 687, 118 Cal. Rptr. 804 (1975) (the court held that when there was animosity between the
grandparent and a parent, it was proper to leave the issue of visitation rights to the discretion of the
parents), (2) the mental health and physical well-being of the child, see Benner v. Benner, 113 Cal.
App. 2d 531, 248 P.2d 425 (1952) (the court allowed visitation because severing the grandparent-
grandchild relationship might have caused an emotional disturbance in the child); see also Lo Presti
v. Lo Presti, 40 N.Y.2d 522, 355 N.E.2d 372, 387 N.Y.S.2d 412 (1976) (the court disallowed grand-
parental visitation because the visits apparently contributed to the child's hyperactivity), and (3) the
child's preference, see Commonwealth ex rel Flannery v. Sharp, 151 Pa. 612, 30 A.2d 810 (1943)
(the court refused grandparental visitation because of the child's protests).
35. See Foster & Freed, The Child's Right to Visit Grandparents, 20 TRIAL 38 (March 1984)
(the child's need-to-know and associate with grandparents). See also Victor, Grandparent and Step-
parent Rights, Assuring Visitation to the Child's Extended Family, 25 TRIAL 55 (April 1989) ("Chil-
dren denied access to their grandparents lose the unconditional love that grandparents can offer
them."); Morris, Grandparents, Uncles, Aunts, Cousins, Friends, 12 FAMILY ADVOCATE 42 (Fall
1989) ("The move toward recognition of third-party rights is a move toward recognition of chil-
dren's rights to have important relationships protected. It is also another step toward the emancipa-
tion of children from the concept that they are the chattels of their parents.").
36. See Victor, supra note 35, at 59 ("The American family is changing, and the legal system
must keep up with its evolution. As the lives of more children are thrown into upheaval by the
divorce or remarriage of their parents, they need even more to maintain stable relationships with
extended and psychological family members."). See also Morris, supra note 35, at 42 (arguing that
children have been traditionally regarded as chattel of their parents and that the best interests of the
child have been ignored when they conflict with parental interests).
7
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These advocates argue that a vital connection exists between grandpar-
ents and children37 and that when this bond is broken, the children suffer
emotionally. Therefore, the state has a valid interest in maintaining the
bond between grandparent and grandchild and may intervene when that
bond is severed; the notion being that the child's needs are paramount.38
The child's rights rationale may be attacked from several directions.
First, most commentators agree that legislatures have been enacting and
revising grandparental visitation statutes due to the lobbying efforts of
grandparents.39 It is doubtful that legislators enacted or revised these
statutes solely with the interests of children in mind, but instead reacted
to strong lobbying efforts of elderly registered voters. Second, some psy-
chological studies assert that the best interests of the child are not served
by a bitter confrontation between parents and grandparents over visita-
tion rights; the theory being that hostility generated in a battle over visi-
tation harms the child more than the deprivation of grandparental
visits." Third, commentators suggest that it is in the child's best inter-
ests to have a single source of authority making child-rearing decisions.4"
Finally, the majority of states provide only for grandparental visitation.
If the legislators were truly interested in the emotional well-being of a
child, it seems logical that they would allow any third party who had
formed a significant relationship with the child to petition for visitation.
However, it is obvious that grandparental visitation statutes exist mainly
for the gratification of grandparents. Through the efforts of lobbying
groups, grandparents have obtained a proprietary interest in their
37. See Ingulli, supra note 23, at 299 (discussing A. KORNHABER & WOODWARD, GRANDPAR-
ENTS AND GRANDCHILDREN: THE VITAL CONNECTION (1981)). Ingufli criticizes the authors for
making sweeping conclusions which other researchers have been unable to duplicate. Id.
38. See Foster & Freed, supra note 35, at 45. Foster and Freed argue that the child's welfare
and right to maintain meaningful associations should be the controlling considerations in visitation
disputes.
39. See Foster & Freed, supra note 35, at 38 ("The senior citizen's lobby has had marked
success in this regard [grandparental visitation statutes] even though such legislation involves an
intrusion into what formerly was regarded as family autonomy.") See also Ingulli, supra note 23, at
297 ("demographic changes have strengthened the political clout of older Americans").
40. See Thompson & Tinsley, Grandparents' Visitation Rights; Legalizing the Ties that Bind,
Am. PSYCHOLOGIST 1217, 1219 (Sept. 1989).
41. See Comment, supra note 29, at 124, n.31 (quoting GOLDSTEIN, FREUD & SOLNIT, BEFORE
THE BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD 25 (1979)). The author asserts that:
Children... react even to temporary infringement of parental autonomy with anxiety,
diminishing trust, loosening of emotional ties, or an increasing tendency to be out of con-
trol ....
At no stage should intrusion in the family be authorized unless probable and sufficient
cause for the coercive action has been established in accord with limits prospectively and
precisely defined by the legislature.
[V/ol. 26:245
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grandchildren. It is ironic that this type of proprietary interest of adults
in children is exactly what child rights advocates seek to avoid.
II. HISTORY OF GRANDPARENTAL VISITATION IN OKLAHOMA
A. Common Law and the First Enactment
Notwithstanding the fact that grandparental visitation rights were
limited at common law, Oklahoma legislators have gradually broadened
these rights. Under Oklahoma common law, grandparents did not have
a legal right to visitation unless they had held a custodial relationship
with their grandchild.42 Beginning with the enactment of Oklahoma's
first grandparental visitation statute,a3 any grandparent who was parent
to a deceased parent could have been awarded reasonable visitation
rights if in the best interest of the child. This statute took effect when
either one or both parents were deceased.' The legislature subsequently
expanded grandparental visitation rights in 1975, when it gave grandpar-
ents the statutory right to petition for visitation in cases of divorce.4a
B. A Period of Strict Construction and Legislative Confusion
In 1978 the legislature amended Oklahoma's grandparental visita-
tion statute again in response to the Oklahoma Supreme Court decision
in In re Fox 4  The court determined in Fox that the policy of the
Oklahoma Uniform Adoption Act47 precluded the application of the
42. Julien v. Gardner, 628 P.2d 1165, 1166 (Okla. 1981). Oklahoma, for the most part, fol-
lowed the rule announced in Succession of Reiss, 46 La. Ann. 347, 15 So. 151 (1894), that the
obligation to allow grandparental visitation was a moral, as opposed to a legal, obligation. Id. at
152.
43. OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 5 (1971). For the text of the 1971 version of Oklahoma's grandpa-
rental visitation statute, see supra note 24.
44. In keeping with the derivative rights theory, the grandparents derived their right to visita-
tion through the child's deceased parents. See supra notes 23-29 and accompanying text.
45. OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 5 (1975) provided that "[wlhen one or both parents are deceased orif
they are divorced, any grandparent, who is the parent of the child's deceased or divorced parent, shall
have reasonable rights of visitation to the child, when it is in the best interest of the child." Id.
46. 567 P.2d 985 (Okla. 1977).
47. OKLA. STAT. tit. 10,§ 60.16 (1971). The Oklahoma Uniform Adoption Act established the
relationship of a natural parent and child upon a final decree of adoption:
(1) After the final decree of adoption is entered, the relation of parent and child and all the
rights, duties and other legal consequences of the natural relation of child and parent shall
thereafter exist between such adopted child and the adoptive parents adopting such child
and the kindred of the adoptive parents. From the date of the final decree of adoption, the
child shall be entitled to inherit real and personal property from and through the adoptive
parents in accordance with the statutes of descent and distribution, and the adoptive par-
ents shall be entitled to inherit real and personal property from and through the child in
accordance with said statutes. (2) After a final decree of adoption is entered, the natural
parents of the adopted child, unless they are the adoptive parents or the spouse of an
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grandparental visitation statute. The court held that in cases of adop-
tion, public policy required a severance of all ties to the child's former
family. As a result of Fox, the legislature amended Oklahoma's grandpa-
rental visitation statute to forbid the termination of grandparent's visita-
tion rights after a subsequent adoption by a stepparent if the grandparent
was the parent of the deceased parent.4  Further, the amendment al-
lowed grandparental visitation rights only if both parents were deceased,
whereas previously the statute allowed visitation where one or both par-
ents were deceased.49 However, the third paragraph of the statute pro-
hibited the termination of grandparental visitation rights in cases of
stepparent adoption where one natural parent was deceased and the
other had subsequently remarried. The language allowing general visita-
tion rights when both parents were deceased was probably the result of
sloppy legislative drafting as it led to confusing results. As the statute
stood, the grandparents of a deceased parent had no visitation rights un-
less the surviving parent executed adoption to a blood relative or unless
the grandparents had previously gained access to the child before adop-
tion by a stepparent. That the confusing results were unintentional is fur-
ther demonstrated by the fact that the legislature also amended the
Oklahoma Uniform Adoption Act to specifically address grandparental
visitation rights in the case of adoption by a blood relative.5" However,
the amendment to the Uniform Adoption Act permitted a right to visita-
tion where one or both parents of a child were deceased and an adoption
adoptive parent, shall be relieved of all parental responsibilities for said child and have no
rights over such adopted child or to his property by descent and distribution.
Id. (emphasis added).
48. OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 5 (Supp. 1978) provided in pertinent part that:
When one natural parent is deceased and the surviving natural parent remarries, any subse-
quent adoption proceedings shall not terminate any grandparental rights belonging to the
parents of the deceased natural parent unless ordered by the court and after opportunity to
be heard, provided the district court deems it in the best interest of the child.
Id.
49. OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 5 (Supp. 1978). See supra note 48. For the pertinent text of the 1975
version, see supra note 45.
50. OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 60.16(3) (Supp. 1978) provided:
When one or both natural parents of a child are deceased or if they are divorced and a
consent to adoption is executed to a blood relative, any grandparent, who is the parent of
the child's deceased or divorced natural parents, may be given reasonable rights of visita-
tion to the child, in accordance with the provision of Section 5 of this title. The district
courts are vested with jurisdiction to enforce such visitation rights and make orders relative
thereto, upon the filing of a verified application for such visitation rights. Notice as or-
dered by the court shall be given to the person or parent having custody of said child and
the venue of such action shall be in the county of the residence of such person or parent,
provided, however, that this section shall not apply to children born out of wedlock.
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by a blood relative had taken place."1
The legislature realized the resulting incongruity and amended the
grandparental visitation statute after the Oklahoma Supreme Court in-
terpreted the statute literally in Julien v. Gardner.2 In Julien, the court
held that the 1978 version of Oklahoma's grandparental visitation statute
no longer sanctioned grandparental visitation when one parent was de-
ceased. Subsequently, the legislature amended the statute back to its
1975 version which provided for visitation when one or both parents
were deceased. 3
The Oklahoma legislature enacted another reactionary amendment
after the state supreme court's decision in In re K.S. 4 There, the
Oklahoma Supreme Court construed the visitation statute very strictly.
The court held that grandparents could not request visitation to a
grandchild when their child's parental rights had been terminated, as the
statutory language did not explicitly provide for visitation privileges
under those circumstances.55 This interpretation by the court led to the
amendment of 1984 which allowed the parents of persons whose parental
rights had been terminated to have a right to petition for access to their
grandchildren.56
C. Liberal Construction and Equitable Powers
The Oklahoma Supreme Court departed from its tendency of
strictly construing the grandparental visitation statute in In re Cherie
Anne Bomgardner.Y' In Bomgardner, the maternal grandparents sought
visitation rights to their deceased daughter's child under the 1981 version
51. OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 5 (Supp. 1978). For the text of the 1978 version of Oklahoma's
grandparental visitation statute, see supra note 48.
52. 628 P.2d 1165 (Okla. 1981).
53. OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 5 (1981) read in pertinent part: "[w]hen one or both parents are
deceased or if they are divorced .......
54. 654 P.2d 1050 (Okla. 1982).
55. Id. at 1051.
56. OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 5(C) (Supp. 1984) reads:
If the parental rights of one parent have been terminated and the child is in the custody of
the other natural parent, any person who is the parent of the person whose parental rights
have been terminated may be given reasonable rights of visitation where the court deter-
mines that a previous grandparental relationship has existed between the grandparents and
the child and the district court determines it to be in the best interest of the child. Any
subsequent adoption proceedings shall not terminate any court-granted grandparental visi-
tation unless the district court determines it to be in the best interest of the child.
Id.
57. 711 P.2d 92 (Okla. 1985).
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of Oklahoma's grandparental visitation statute. 8 The child's father as-
serted that the 1978 version of the statute, 9 which allowed access only
when both parents were deceased or in cases of divorce, should be applied
because that was the statute in effect at the time of the mother's death.'
The Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the legislative purpose of the
grandparental visitation statute would be best served if the 1981 version
was retroactively applied to "situations in existence at the time of its
enactment."' 6 1
In addition to recognizing a right to visitation under the 1981 ver-
sion of the statute, the court discussed its equitable powers in granting
relief to the grandparents. The court stated that "[e]quity recognizes-
independent of statute-the grandparents' claim to the companionship of
their grandchild."'62 The court relied on a 1984 appellate court deci-
sion,63 as precedent for invoking its equitable powers. However, the 1984
appellate court, in turn, relied on a 1910 parental visitation case.r 4 The
1984 appellate court obviously failed to differentiate parental visitation
from grandparental visitation in relying on the 1910 case. Before Born-
gardner, the Oklahoma Supreme Court had consistently held that grand-
parents had only a statutory right to seek visitation of their
grandchildren. 6  This departure from the court's insistence on a statu-
tory right could have been due to the fact that the court realized that the
legislature probably did not intend the language used in the 1978 version.
Nonetheless, Bomgardner concluded that the grandparents had both eq-
uitable and statutory standing to seek visitation.66
That the court's reliance on equitable reasons for granting visitation
was an anomaly is evidenced by the fact that the court returned to strict
58. OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 5 (1981). Recall, this version allowed visitation when one or both
parents were deceased.
59. OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 5 (Supp. 1978). For the text of the 1978 version of Oklahoma's
grandparental visitation statute, see supra note 48.
60. Bomgardner, 711 P.2d at 94.
61. Id. at 96 (emphasis in original).
62. Id at 97.
63. Id (citing Guardianship of Sherle, 683 P.2d 78 (Okla. Ct. App. 1984)).
64. Guardianship of Sherle, 683 P.2d 78, 80 (Okla. Ct. App. 1984) (citing Allison v. Bryan, 26
Okla. 520, 109 P. 934 (1910)).
65. See Grover v. Phillips, 681 P.2d 81, 83 (Okla. 1984) ("Grandparents have no constitutional
right to custody of or visitation with their grandchildren. Such rights are limited to those conferred
by statute."). See also Julien v. Gardner, 628 P.2d 1165, 1166 (Okla. 1981) ("Under common law,
grandparents did not have the legal right to visit their grandchildren if the parents chose to prohibit
the visitation .... [a] grandparent, absent a custodial right, is not entitled to an award of visitation
privileges in the absence of a statute.").
66. Bomgardner, 711 P.2d at 97.
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statutory construction. In In re G.D.L.,67 a maternal grandmother
sought to secure visitation rights to her grandchild who was being
adopted by strangers.6" The grandmother argued that although she had
no statutory right to visitation, she did have an equitable right as pro-
pounded in Bomgardner.6 9 The court responded that its statement as to
equitable rights of visitation was an interpretation of Oklahoma's 1981
version of the grandparental visitation statute, which was intended by the
legislature to prevent the alienation of the grandchild from the grandpar-
ents when one parent was deceased.70 The court reasoned that because
the purpose of the statute was to prevent alienation from the grandpar-
ents, the court could use its equitable powers to ensure that the purpose
of the statute was met. However, the court maintained that in cases of
adoption by strangers, the policy was different. "Under these circum-
stances compassion for the grandparent 'must give way to the new family
union which the law has created. The severance by adoption must be
complete.' "71 The court added that it had "consistently refused to ex-
tend grandparental rights in adoption cases beyond those specified by the
legislature." 2 The grandmother was therefore denied equitable standing
to request visitation. The court's intimation in Bomgardner that it might
use its newly found equitable powers to grant grandparental visitation
could have been one of the factors leading to the 1989 amendment of the
grandparental visitation statute.
D. The 1989 Amendments-Infringing upon the Nuclear Family
The grandparental visitation statute and the Uniform Adoption Act
when read together after the 1989 amendments generally give the grand-
parent a right to petition for visitation under almost any circumstances
provided it is in the best interest of the child. The 1989 amendments to
Oklahoma's grandparental visitation statute were undoubtedly a re-
sponse to the court's refusal to give grandparental visitation rights in the
situation of an adoption out of the family. Oklahoma's Uniform Adop-
tion Act was amended to simply provide that "[a] grandparent, who is
the parent of the child's natural parents, may be given reasonable rights
of visitation to the child, pursuant to the provisions of [the grandparental
67. 747 P.2d 282 (Okla. 1987).
68. The grandchild had been born out of wedlock. Thus the grandmother could not have peti-
tioned. Id. at 283.
69. Id. at 283 (referring to In re Cherie Anne Bomgardner, 711 P.2d 92, 97 (Okla. 1985)).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 285 (quoting In re Fox, 567 P.2d 985, 1052 (Okla. 1977)).
72. Id. at 284.
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visitation statute]... ."' Previously, the right to petition for grandpa-
rental visitation was allowed only when there had been an adoption by a
blood relative or an adoption by a stepparent.74 The grandparental visi-
tation statute was amended to address the rights of a grandparent whose
grandchild was born out of wedlock, as in In re G.D.L.,75 and now pro-
vides that if a child is born out of wedlock, the parents of the father have
no visitation rights unless the "father has been judicially determined to
be the father of the child.",7 6 Presumably then, the parents of a mother
whose child is born out of wedlock will be treated no differently than any
other grandparents," except in the case of termination of parental
rights.
7 8
The most controversial aspect of the 1989 amendment is that it al-
lows courts considerable discretion in granting grandparents access to
their grandchildren when the nuclear family is intact, provided the visita-
tion is in the best interest of the child. Whether intended or not, the
legislature has limited the rights of parents in an ongoing marriage to
make basic decisions about how their children should be reared. Under
Oklahoma's statutory scheme, the parents' authority to control un-
wanted grandparental influence is severely limited. Parental judgment
about what is best for their child may be undermined by a judge who
73. OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 60.16 (1989).
74. OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 60.16(3) (Supp. 1978). See supra note 50.
75. 747 P.2d 282 (Okla. 1987). See supra notes 67-72 and accompanying text.
76. OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 5(A)(2) (Supp. 1989) provides that:
Except as otherwise provided by paragraphs 5 and 6 of this subsection, if a child is born
out of wedlock, the parents of the father of such child shall not have the right of visitation
authorized by this section unless such father has been judicially determined to be the father
of the child.
Id
77. OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 5(A)(6) (Supp. 1989) reads:
If the child is born out of wedlock and the parental rights of the mother of the child have
been terminated, the parents of the mother of such child shall not have a right of visitation
authorized by this section to such child unless: (a) the court determines that a previous
grandparental relationship existed between the grandparents and the child; and (b) the
court determines such visitation rights to be in the best interest of the child.
d Paragraph 5 makes the same provision for a parent of a father whose child was born out of
wedlock and whose parental rights have been terminated with the additional requirement that the
father have been judicially determined to be the father of the child. It seems that in the language of
these sections, there is a presumption against grandparental visitation unless the grandparent can
prove the existence of the enumerated requisites in the statute.
78. Under these circumstances, the right to visitation is granted to the grandparent who is
related to the parent whose parental rights have been terminated, provided that a previous relation-
ship existed and the court determines visitation to be in the best interest of the child.
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believes grandparental visits are basically good and can have no detri-
mental effect on the child. Although the state can constitutionally inter-
vene through its parens patriae powers when the child's welfare is at
stake, the state should not be allowed to intervene merely under the
vague "best interest of the child" standard.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
A. Meyer v. Nebraska
The United States Supreme Court has recognized a fundamental lib-
erty interest under the Fourteenth Amendment in the right of parents to
rear their children as they see fit. 79 In Meyer v. Nebraska,8 the Court,
recognizing this liberty interest, struck down a statute which forbade the
teaching of a foreign language to any child below ninth grade. The Court
held that because the teaching of a foreign language to a child would not
be harmful to the child, the state had no power to interfere with the
parents' decision to educate their child in a foreign language. The Court
stated, with regard to the Fourteenth Amendment, that:
While this Court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty
thus guaranteed, the term has received much consideration and some
of the included things have been definitely stated. Without doubt, it
denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of
the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupa-
tions of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home
and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his
own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recog-
nized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by
free men.81
This reference to the "privileges long recognized at common law"' 2 has
become the hook upon which to hang the mantle of familial autonomy.
The traditional privilege of parents to make decisions regarding the up-
bringing of their children was recognized as a constitutional right under
the law of this case.83
79. See generally Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 649-51 (1972).
80. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
81. Id at 399. The Court stated that "[n]o emergency has arisen which renders knowledge by a
child of some language other than English so clearly harmful as to justify its inhibition with the
consequent infringement of rights long freely enjoyed." Id at 403.
82. Id. at 399.
83. Of course, no right is absolute and the Court must weigh competing interests to determine
which will prevail. In Meyer, the Court used a reasonable or rational relation test to weigh legiti-
mate state interests against parental interests. Modernly, when the Court recognizes a fundamental
right, it will apply a stricter standard of scrutiny.
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B. The Liberty Interest of Parents
Subsequent Supreme Court decisions have further reinforced the no-
tion that parents or custodians have a right to control the upbringing of
their children. In Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 4 the Court faced another
challenge to the rights of parents to educate their children as they saw fit.
An Oregon statute required parents to send their children to public pri-
mary schools. The Court again held that the statute unreasonably inter-
fered with the liberty interest of parents and guardians to control the
upbringing and education of their children. 5 In Prince v. Massachu-
setts,"6 the Court stated that "[i]t is cardinal with us that the custody,
care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary
function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can
neither supply nor hinder." 7 The Court emphasized the importance of
the family in Stanley v. Illinois,"8 when it stated that "[tlhe integrity of
the family unit has found protection in the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment... , the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment... and the Ninth Amendment." 9 Additionally, the
Court in Wisconsin v. Yoder 9" held that Amish parents had a right to
rear their children according to their own religious tenets.91
The Supreme Court, however, has never held that the parent's right
to rear a child is absolute. The Court has recognized that the state does
have a legitimate interest in protecting the welfare of children. In Prince
v. Massachusetts,92 the Court rejected the argument of the custodial aunt
that, because of her parental rights, she could give permission to her
niece to distribute religious material on the street in violation of the
state's child labor laws.93 The Court held that the state's parens patriae
84. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
85. Id. at 534-35.
86. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
87. Id. at 166.
88. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
89. Id. at 651.
90. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). Yoder may be considered as primarily a free exercise case involving
freedom of religion. However, the Court, in reaching its conclusions, balanced the interests of the
state in universal education against the interests of the Yoders in exercising their First Amendment
rights and their traditional interests as parents in the religious upbringing of their children. The
Court held that when the interests of parenthood are combined with a free exercise claim, the state
must determine more than a merely "reasonable relation to some purpose within the competency of
the State" to uphold the validity of its objectives. Id. at 214. The Court has subsequently treated
Yoder as a substantive due process case involving parental rights.
91. Id. at 233.
92. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
93. Id. at 164.
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power could be invoked to protect minors from the:
crippling effects of child employment... and the possible harms ais-
ing from other activities subject to all the diverse influences of the
street. It is too late now to doubt that legislation appropriately
designed to reach such evils is within the state's police power, whether
against the parent's claim to control of the child or one that religious
scruples dictate contrary action.94
Notice that the Court spoke in terms of protection against "evil" to the
child. The language indicates that only when there is an "evil" which is
threatening the child's welfare will the Court allow the state to invoke its
parens patriae or police powers.9"
The Supreme Court clarified its position as to when a state may jus-
tify using its parenspatriae or police power to restrict parental autonomy
in Wisconsin v. Yoder.96 In Yoder, the Court held that a compulsory
state secondary education law was unconstitutional as applied because it
restricted the rights of Amish parents to raise their children according to
Amish religious principles. The Court rejected the state's parens patriae
and police power argument by stating that "[tihis case, of course, is not
one in which any harm to the physical or mental health of the child or to
the public safety, peace, order or welfare has been demonstrated." 97
Thus in Yoder, the Court found no threat to the individual child's health
or safety and no threat to society by allowing Amish children to leave
public schools after the eighth grade. Although Yoder and Prince are
principally first amendment religious freedom cases, they suggest that the
state must demonstrate a compelling interest in the child's welfare or in
the public welfare in order to justify its intervention into the private
realm of the family.
C. Extended Family Rights
1. Preserving Family Autonomy Beyond the Nuclear Family
The Supreme Court has recognized that the protection given by the
94. Id. at 168-69.
95. See Comment, supra note 4, wherein the author explains that the state may regulate the
family either through its police powers or through its parens patriae powers. The police power is the
state's inherent power to protect citizens against each other and to promote the general welfare. The
parens patriae power is the state's limited paternalistic power to protect or promote the welfare of
certain individuals, usually those who are legally incompetent. Parens patriae powers should always
be used in the best interest of the incompetent individual. Id. at 1202.
96. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
97. Id. at 230. The Court indicated that allowing Amish children to leave the public schools
after eighth grade would not burden society by taking jobs away from adults, as the Amish children
would return to their parents' farms and be trained in an agricultural vocation. Id. at 229-34.
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Fourteenth Amendment to family autonomy does not apply merely to
nuclear families but also to nontraditional families. For example, in
Prince v. Massachusetts,98 the Court indirectly granted parental status to
a custodial aunt when it recognized her right to parental control of a
child.99 Furthermore, in Moore v. City of East Cleveland" the Court
held that the Fourteenth Amendment preserved autonomy within the ex-
tended family. The Court ruled that an ordinance limiting the occu-
pancy of a dwelling to a single family violated due process rights because
it defined "family" in a way which prohibited a grandmother from living
with her son and two grandsons.101 The Court stated that the historical
recognition of a family and the tradition of an extended family living
together had "roots" which were "equally venerable and equally deserv-
ing of constitutional recognition." 102
The Supreme Court's recognition of the rights of an extended family
is not inconsistent with its treatment of the nuclear family; rather the
Court has merely expanded the meaning of the word "family." When
defining "family," the Court apparently examines the function the family
serves and the established relationships between family members.103 In
Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform,"° the
Court considered whether a foster family might have a constitutionally
protected liberty interest. Although the Court decided the case without
coming to a conclusion on the protected status of a foster family, 105 it did
clarify what attributes are necessary for the family to merit constitutional
protection." The Court will first look for a biological relationship; but
this is not necessarily determinative of the existence of a family.107 The
Court stated rather that "the importance of the familial relationship...
stems from the emotional attachments that derive from the intimacy of
98. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
99. Id. at 166.
100. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
101. Id. at 499.
102. Id at 504.
103. See Comment, supra note 4, at 1181-82. The author states that when the Court recognizes
a traditional value as a right, it determines what characteristics of that traditional value give it the
fundamental constitutional importance and then the Court may apply a functional approach to the
right to determine the scope of that right. Id.
104. 431 U.S. 816 (1977).
105. The Court stated that it did not have to come to a conclusion as to whether a foster family
should be afforded a constitutional liberty interest because even if the foster family did have a sub-
stantive liberty interest, the procedural due process afforded them by the state was adequate. Id. at
847.
106. Id. at 844.
107. Id (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 231-33 (1972)).
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daily association, and from the role it plays in 'promot[ing] a way of life'
through the instruction of children... as well as from the fact of blood
relationship."' 108 Thus the Court seems to be adopting at least a func-
tional definition of the family in which those adults who perform paren-
tal functions may be given constitutional protection against unnecessary
state intrusion into their families.
2. Grandparents--Outside the Court's Functional Extension
Grandparental rights advocates incorrectly use Moore v. City ofEast
Cleveland 109 to argue the existence of a constitutionally protected right
of grandparents to have access to their grandchildren. The Supreme
Court has never recognized a constitutionally protected right of grand-
parents to have the companionship of their grandchildren against the
wishes of the parents. In Moore, the Court recognized that "in times of
adversity,... the broader family... [may] come together for mutual
sustenance and to maintain or rebuild a secure home life." 110 Here there
was a choice among all family members to live together as a family unit
to fulfill emotional and economic needs. The Court rejected the state's
attempt of "standardizing its children-and its adults-by forcing all to
live in certain narrowly defined family patterns."1
1
'
3. Grandparental Visitation-In Loco Parentis
A consensual agreement to live together as a family ought to be dis-
tinguished from the situation in which a grandparent petitions a court for
visitation rights to a child. When grandparents request access to their
grandchildren from the courts, it is usually over one or both parents'
objections. There is typically dissension between the caretakers of the
child and the grandparent who desires access to the child. In the case of
a traditional nuclear family, the parents have already chosen the family's
boundaries and wish to exclude the petitioning grandparent. If the
grandparents have not had an "in loco parentis"" relationship with the
grandchild, there should be no right of visitation. However, if the
grandchild had been living with the grandparents in a familial situation,
108. Id.
109. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
110. Id. at 505.
111. Id. at 506.
112. The phrase "in loco parentis" means in place of the parent and generally refers to a person
who performs the functions of a parent. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 787 (6th ed. 1990).
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then the grandparents ought to prevail on a constitutional claim for visi-
tation rights legitimately based on the child's welfare.
The grandparents' constitutional claim would arise under the state's
parens patriae powers which allow the state to intervene in a familial
relationship if the welfare of the child is at stake. 1 3 States have become
increasingly responsive to the child's right to both physical and psycho-
logical health. It may be presumed that when the grandparents have a
custodial or "de facto" parental relationship with the child, that the child
will form a substantial psychological bond with the grandparents, just as
the child bonds with his or her parents." 4 Psychologists argue that sev-
ering this type of bond causes psychological harm to the child."' Thus,
the forced separation of a child from a parental figure should be treated
as a definite threat to the child's welfare and a circumstance compelling
enough to override parental autonomy interests.
4. In Cases of a Dysfunctional Family
Grandparental visitation may also be warranted in cases in which
the nuclear or custodial family has disintegrated or in clear cases of child
abuse or neglect. 1' 6 The meaning of disintegration should be construed
to cover a wide range of circumstances in which a parent is absent from
the family for a period of time. Although many states allow visitation in
the case of death of a parent or divorce,' 17 they fail to consider other
situations in which a child may be deprived of access to a parent. States
should enact statutes such as the recently enacted Texas grandparental
visitation statute which allows access when a parent is incarcerated or
found to be incompetent, when parental rights are terminated, or in cases
of abuse or neglect.'s State intervention is justified because a child may
113. For a general discussion of the states parenspatriae powers, see Comment, supra note 4 at
1199-1202.
114. See GOLDSTEIN, FREUD & SOLNIT, BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 39-57
(1979). In discussing "psychological parents," the authors note that "[w]hen longtime foster parents
... return a child's affection and make him feel wanted, looked after and appreciated, crucial bonds
usually form between them which cannot be disturbed without harm." Id. at 40. See also J. WAL-
LERSTEIN & J. KELLY, SURVIVING THE BREAKUP: How CHILDREN AND PARENTS COPE WITH
DIVORCE 43-44 (1980) ("Those children who had extended families, especially grandparents, who
were close by or who kept up a continuing interest from a distance were very much helped by this
support system."). Id. at 222.
115. GOLDSTEIN, FREUD & SoLNrr, supra note 114, at 39-57.
116. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1012 (1989) (permitting grandparents of abused or neglected
children to petition for visitation); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.03(e) (Vernon Supp. 1989) (same).
117. Twenty-eight states specifically allow visitation upon death of a parent or divorce. See
Segal & George, supra note 14, at 9, n.16.
118. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.03(e) (Vernon Supp. 1990).
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need as much emotional support under these circumstances as he would
in cases of a death of a parent and divorce.
Some psychological studies affirm a need for grandparental support
when the family has been disrupted and becomes dysfunctional.119 There
are a number of studies that link the loss of a parent to later psychologi-
cal problems, such as depression.12 Psychological harm may be mini-
mized if the child receives support from other familial members. 121This
is not to say, however, that grandparents should be given an automatic
right to access under these circumstances. In some cases, hostility be-
tween the custodial parent and the petitioning grandparent could cause
more psychological harm than good to the child,122 and thus visitation
should not be granted. The deprivation of a parent or of a custodian
should be regarded as a triggering mechanism which allows the state and
grandparents to constitutionally intervene, because at such point there
reasonably may be psychological harm to a child which may be assuaged
by a grandparent or by another third party. The court must consider the
individual circumstances of each case when determining what is in the
best interest of the child.
IV. GRANDPARENTAL VIsrrATION IN INTACT FAMILIES
A. Familial Autonomy at the Apex
When the family is intact and functional, the interests of the state,
parents or custodians, and the child are all aligned and the right to famil-
ial autonomy, for several reasons, is at its apex. First, as an "impersonal
political institution" '23 the state is ill-equipped to provide the love and
emotional support needed for a child's healthy development. 24 Only
119. A family is dysfunctional when it does not meet the child's basic physical and/or psycho-
logical needs. See J. WALLERSTEIN & J. KELLY, supra note 114, at 43-44. See also Thompson &
Tinsley, supra note 40, at 1217. Grandparents may serve as role models for grandchildren and this
role might take an added significance when parents divorce, due to the divisive effect of divorce on
the parent-child relationship. However, Thompson and Tinsley argue that there have not been
enough psychological studies done to justify the presumption that children will benefit from grand-
parental visitation over the objections of custodial parents. Thompson & Tinsley, supra note 40, at
1220.
120. Ingulli, supra note 23, at 311, n.103.
121. See generally Derdeyn, Grandparent Visitation Right" Rendering Family Dissension More
Pronounced?, 55 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHiATRY 77 (1985). See also Thompson & Tinsley, supra note
40, at 1220. The authors note that a child experiences loyalty conflicts in a divorce proceeding
between his parents, so it is unlikely that an additional legal conflict between family members will
assist the child in coping.
122. Thompson & Tinsley, supra note 40, at 1220.
123. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 638 (1979).
124. Comment, supra note 4, at 1214-16.
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parents who have a continuous relationship with their child are capable
of caring for and nurturing the child, and making important decisions
regarding the child's welfare. 121 Second, the family serves as a primary
unit of socialization for the state. The family instills societal values in the
child and prepares the child to become a self-reliant citizen. 126 Third,
family autonomy fosters social pluralism.'27 The Supreme Court has re-
peatedly recognized the desirability of a heterogenous society which
helps impede the state's tendency to standardize its citizens. 128 Thus, it
is in the best interest of the state to presume that parents are acting in the
best interest of their children.
Because the state benefits from the autonomous family, it should not
be allowed to intervene absent a compelling reason. State intrusion
should be kept to a minimum when the family is intact. The state's inter-
vention into a family is legitimate only when the child's welfare is
threatened, 29 because then and only then do state interests align with the
child's interest to overcome parental autonomy. However, because fa-
milial autonomy is of paramount importance, the state should intervene
only when there can be a reasonable presumption of harm to the child.
A grandparental visitation statute which allows visitation under any
circumstances is a significant infringement upon the right of parental de-
cision-making. The Supreme Court has held that when significant in-
fringement of a fundamental right is at issue, the state must have a
compelling interest to justify that infringement. 3 ° Nothing is more fun-
damental in rearing a child than deciding with whom the child should
125. Comment, supra note 4, at 1214.
126. Comment, supra note 4, at 1215.
127. Comment, supra note 4, at 1215.
128. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (the state may not "standardize its
children by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only"); see also Meyer v. Ne-
braska, 262 U.S. 390, 402 (1923) (The state may not "foster a homogenous people.").
129. See generally Bean, supra note 8, at 403-405.
130. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 497 (1965)(Goldberg, J. concurring); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). There is some contro-
versy as to whether all substantive due process cases require strict scrutiny analysis. For example:
In due process analysis no threshold marks the passage from the most minimal to the most
exacting scrutiny.... As an intrusion becomes more destructive of a right, it may be
outweighed only by increasingly substantial state interests, and the degree of fit demanded
between the means and ends will increase as well.
Comment, supra note 4, at 1195 (footnotes omitted). That author further notes that:
Even given a balancing approach, the Court's use of strict scrutiny language in substantive
due process cases might not be wholly inappropriate. Precedent suggests that the compel-
ling interest test accurately reflects the level of justification which the state must supply
when its infringement of the right is at its apex.
Id. at 1196. Some courts see court-enforced grandparental visitation as a minimal intrusion upon the
family, and therefore feel the state may intervene without demonstrating a compelling interest.
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associate. Even though grandparents are usually deemed to be benign
influences upon the child, they may have beliefs which are directly anti-
thetical to the parents' beliefs. They may not agree as to the best way to
rear a child, how to educate that child, or what religious beliefs the child
should hold. A court which orders visitation in the grandparent's home
is taking substantial control away from the parent and placing that con-
trol in the hands of the grandparent; thus, elevating the grandparent to
parental status. Surely, allowing parties outside the defined family to in-
terfere in parental control, absent any harm to the child, is a gross in-
fringement on the parents' rights to rear their child as they see fit.
B. Lower Court Treatment of "'Intact Family" Statutes
The majority of lower courts of those states which have "intact fam-
fly" visitation statutes have generally upheld the constitutionality of
those statutes when challenged. In Spradling v. Harris,3 a Kansas ap-
pellate court determined that the Kansas grandparental visitation statute
was constitutional. 132 The court, in considering the constitutionality of
the statute, referred to a previous Kansas Supreme Court case which
held that "[t]he parents' rights are subordinate to the State's parens pa-
triae powers and must yield when adverse to the best intersts of the
child." 13 3 The Kansas court also stated that although the United States
Supreme Court has found certain rights to exist which are not explicitly
enumerated in the Constitution, "the right to limit grandparental visita-
tion has not been recognized." 134 In addition, a New York Family Court
has upheld as constitutional New York's grandparental visitation stat-
ute.1 35 In Frances E. v. Peter E. 136 the court reasoned that because the
Courts with this attitude generally apply the "best interest of the child" standard and may award
visitation simply because the parents cannot prove it would be detrimental to the child's emotional
or physical health. Little consideration is given to the parents' rights since the intrusion is consid-
ered to be so minor. For a discussion of such cases, see Bean, supra note 9, at 403-405.
131. 13 Kan. App. 2d 595, 778 P.2d 365 (1989).
132. The case involved a grandmother who was requesting access to her daughter's two children
by a previous marriage, with whom she said she had developed a "substantial bond" and to another
child born out of her daughter's present marriage, with whom she had barely had any contact. The
court granted her access to all these children under a statute which allowed grandparental visitation
when the child's best interests were served and when "a substantial relationship" existed between the
child and the grandparent. Id. at 596, 778 P.2d at 366 (citing KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-129(a) (Supp.
1987)).
133. Id. at 597, 778 P.2d at 367 (quoting In re Cooper, 230 Kan. 57, 62, 631 P.2d 632, 637
(1981)).
134. Id. at 598, 778 P.2d at 368.
135. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 72 (McKinney Supp. 1990) provides for grandparental visitation
"where circumstances show that conditions exist which equity would see fit to intervene." Id.
136. 125 Misc. 2d 164, 479 N.Y.S.2d 319 (Fain. Ct. 1984).
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state had traditionally been permitted to grant visitation when the parent
was widowed, divorced, remarried or unmarried, it would be giving mar-
ried parents greater constitutional protection if they were able to block
visitation merely because they were married. 137 The court concladed
that it could entertain a visitation petition against an "intact family,"
even though there was an absence of extraordinary circumstances, be-
cause that was what the legislature intended.'38 A later New York Fam-
ily Court concurred with the Frances E. decision. The court in Eda C.M.
v. Mary K. 139 found that New York's broad grant of authority to protect
the child's best interest was a proper use of the state's "police power,"
noting that the statute had been found constitutional "in every case that
had been reported."'14°
Although no cases were found in which a state court ruled its "in-
tact family" statute to be unconstitutional, a few cases do support the
contention that courts should severely limit intervention into intact fami-
lies. In Theodore R. v. Loretta J.,111 the New York Family Court, con-
trary to previous decisions by the same court, chose to limit its authority
to award third-party visitation when dealing with an intact family. The
court stated that the parent's right to make decisions as to whether their
137. Id. at 168, 479 N.Y.S.2d at 322.
138. Id at 169, 479 N.Y.S.2d at 323.
139. 14 FAM. L.R. 1488 (BNA 1988). Prior to this case, in New York, the same family court
came to divergent conclusions when it considered the constitutionality of its state statute in two
different cases. Both cases involved grandparents seeking visitation rights to grandchildren whose
families were intact. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §§ 72 (McKinney 1990) provides for grandparental
visitation "where circumstances show that conditions exist in which equity would intervene." Id. In
the first case, Theodore R. v. Loretta J., 124 Misc. 2d 546, 547, 476 N.Y.S.2d 720, 721 (Fam. Ct.
1984), the court determined that in order for the visitation statute to be constitutionally valid, the
phrase "where circumstances show that equity sees fit to intervene," must be interpreted to mean
that only in extreme circumstances can there be state or third party intervention. The court stated
that "[mIere protestations of love and affection between a grandparent and grandchild are insuffi-
cient to warrant the intervention of the Court." Id. at 548, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 721. Ironically, the
same court, with a different judge presiding, held that the statute was constitutional as applied to
intact families. In Frances E. v. Peter E, 125 Misc. 2d 164, 479 N.Y.S.2d 319 (Fam. Ct. 1984), the
court reasoned that, because the state has traditionally been permitted to grant visitation over a
parent's wishes when that parent is widowed, divorced, remarried or unmarried, it would be giving
married parents greater constitutional protection if they were able to block visitation merely because
they were married. Id. at 168, 479 N.Y.S.2d at 322. The court, contrary to the Theodore R. deci-
sion, held that it could entertain a visitation petition against an "intact family" even in the absence of
extraordinary circumstances, because that was the intention of the legislature. Id. at 170, 479
N.Y.S.2d at 323.
140. 14 FAM. L.R. 1488 (BNA 1988).
141. 124 Misc. 2d 546, 476 N.Y.S.2d 720 (Fam. Ct. 1984).
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children should have contact with third-parties must be given "para-
mount consideration" and court intervention must be limited to "ex-
treme situations."' 42 In Ward v. Ward, 43 a Delaware family court faced
a constitutional challenge to the state's grandparental visitation statute
which prevented visitation when "the natural or adoptive parents of the
child are cohabiting as husband and wife" and both parents object."4
The grandparents argued that the statute deprived them of their due pro-
cess rights. 45 The court concluded that grandparents have a constitu-
tionally protected interest only if they had held a prior custodial
relationship with the child.146 The court went on to state, arguendo, that
even if the grandparents did have a liberty interest, the interest would
become "substantially attenuated" when the interests of the child's par-
ents conflict with the grandparents' interests. 47
Although the most recent decision 48 dealing with Connecticut's
"intact family" grandparental visitation statute149 failed to decide the
statute's constitutional validity, the Supreme Court of Connecticut dis-
cussed which factors it considered relevant in deciding whether a grand-
parent should receive visitation rights.150 The court spoke of harm to the
child as a reason to grant visitation, but went on to state that "[e]ven
absent child abuse, there is no compelling constitutional requirement that
the legislature must defer ... to the child-rearing preferences of the nu-
clear family."' 51 The court gave deference to the legislature, explaining
that the legislature could choose to recognize a public interest in giving a
child access to people outside the nuclear family who show concern for
the child's growth and development.152 Thus, the court indicated its
142. Id. at 547, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 721.
143. 537 A.2d 1063 (Del. Fam. Ct. 1987).
144. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 950(7) (Supp. 1988) provides that the court may:
Upon petition thereto, grant grandparents reasonable visitation rights as the Court shall
determine with respect to the grandchild, regardless of marital status of the parents of the
child or the relationship of the grandparents to the person having custody of the child;
provided, however, that when the natural or adoptive parents of the child are cohabiting as
husband and wife, grandparent visitation shall not be granted over both parents' objection.
145. Ward, 537 A.2d at 1066.
146. Id at 1067.
147. Id at 1067-68.
148. Lehrer v. Davis, 214 Conn. 232, 571 A.2d 691 (1990).
149. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-59 (West 1986) provides, in pertinent part, that the "[c]ourt may
grant the right of visitation.., to any person .... Such order shall be according to the court's best
judgment upon the facts of the czse and subject to such conditions and limitations as it deems
equitable ..... " Id
150. Lehrer, 214 Conn. 232, 571 A.2d 691 (1990).
151. Id. at 238, 571 A.2d at 694-95.
152. Id at 239, 571 A.2d at 695.
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scales would tip in favor of state intervention as opposed to parental
autonomy.
In summary, state courts tend to uphold as constitutional the broad
grant of authority given them by legislatures to intervene into visitation
disputes. Only in Theodore R. did the court choose to limit its authority
to intervene. In Ward v. Ward, the visitation statute forbidding third
party visitation when both parents objected was upheld because of the
constitutional imperative of deference to parental authority.153 In the
remaining cases, the courts indicated that they would tolerate a low
threshold of state intervention.1 54 The court in Spradling went so far as
to disregard expert psychological testimony that grandparental visits
against the mother's wishes could cause actual harm to the child and
awarded visitation based on the alleged mutual affection between the
grandparent and grandchild. 55 Clearly, parental autonomy has been se-
verely eroded by the states' expansion of their parens patriae powers.
C. Predicting the Reaction of the Oklahoma Supreme Court
The Oklahoma Supreme Court will probably follow the trend initi-
ated by other jurisdictions if confronted by a constitutional challenge to
the state's grandparental visitation statute. A review of previous deci-
sions addressing grandparental visitation provides clues as to how the
court might resolve the issue. The Oklahoma Supreme Court has held
that grandparents have no constitutional right to custody or visitation
with their grandchildren, but these rights may be conferred from statute
or derived through custody in the absence of a statute. 156 However, the
court in Bomgardner "7 held that equity recognized, independent of stat-
ute, a grandparent's claim to associate with their grandchild. This might
have been an anomaly, as the court realized that the legislature had
merely made a mistake in drafting the language of the amendment. 158 In
In re KS.,' 59 the court seemed to defer to parental autonomy when it
recognized that" '[t]he right of a parent to the companionship, care, cus-
tody and management of his/her child is a basic fundamental right pro-
tected by the United States and Oklahoma Constitutions.' "I' However,
153. Ward, 537 A.2d at 1069.
154. See supra notes 131-152 and accompanying text.
155. Spradling v. Harris, 13 Kan. App. 2d 595, 600, 778 P.2d 365, 369 (1989).
156. Julien v. Gardner, 628 P.2d 1165, 1166 (Okla. 1981).
157. 711 P.2d 92 (Okla. 1985).
158. See In re G.D.L., 747 P.2d 282, 283 (Okla. 1987).
159. 654 P.2d 1050 (Okla. 1982).
160. Id. at 1052 (quoting Leake v. Grissom, 614 P.2d 1107, 1110 (Okla. 1980)).
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the court also stated that " '[t]his court is not insensitive to the yearning
of grandparents for the company of their grandchildren. However, this
longing may not be translated into a legal right in the absence of a statute
dictating visitation.' "161 The court's insistence that there be statutory
authority for its actions implies that the court will accept whatever the
legislature deems appropriate regarding its authority to grant grandpa-
rental visitation.
There is still the question of how the court will interpret the "best
interest of the child" standard. In Davis v. Davis,62 the Oklahoma
Supreme Court stated that "[s]tatutes that abrogate the common law are
to be liberally construed-but only within the parameters of the legisla-
tive objective." '163 With no legislative history in Oklahoma, it is difficult
to construe legislative objectives. But the court had previously stated
that the purpose of the grandparental visitation statute was to prevent
the alienation of a child from his grandparents. When the court invoked
its equitable powers to recognize grandparental visitation, the court
spoke of the "grandparents' claim to the companionship of their
grandchild." ' In another case, the court spoke of compassion for the
grandparent.1 65 Thus, the court indicated that sympathy for the grand-
parents will play a role in the decision of whether to award visitation.
Courts which consider grandparental feelings tend to tolerate a very low
threshold of intervention and award visitation on the sentimental notion
that grandparental visits are good for the child.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Oklahoma grandparental visitation statute is an infringement
upon the constitutional rights of parents to control and manage their
children. The only legislative directive given to guide the court is the
"best interest of the child" standard. This standard, when unattached to
any triggering mechanism, gives the court free reign in determining when
grandparental visitation should be granted. It effectively substitutes the
court's opinion regarding what is best for the child for the parents' opin-
ion. In the absence of harm to the child, there is no justifiable reason for
the state to order grandparental visitation over the parents' objections.
Parents of an intact, functional family should be able to decide that a
161. Id. at 1052 (quoting Leake v. Grissom, 614 P.2d 1107, 1110 (Okla. 1980)).
162. 708 P.2d 1102 (Okla. 1985).
163. Id. at 111.
164. Bomgardner, 711 P.2d at 97.
165. In re G.D.L., 747 P.2d 282, 285 (Okla. 1987).
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relationship with grandparents is contrary to the best interest of the
child. It should be the parents' constitutional right to limit or deny any
third-party visitation without judicial scrutiny.
State statutes should be drafted so that only specific situations allow
grandparents or other interested third parties access to a minor child.
These situations should be enumerated within the statutes so that risk of
unwarranted state intruaion into familial decisions will be minimized.
Such situations should include death of a parent, divorce, incarceration
of a parent, a finding that the parents are unfit, upon termination of pa-
rental rights, in cases of child abuse or neglect, upon placing the child in
a foster home, upon any prolonged absence of a parent, or upon finding
that a third party has had a custodial relationship with the child. Only
when a specific familial situation exists in which it is likely that the child
will be harmed, either physically or psychologically, should a third party
be allowed to petition the court for access to the child. A statute which
limits state intervention to situations in which there is potential harm to
the child will help preserve familial autonomy without sacrificing the
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